In this paper we explore the information content of a large set of scal indicators for US real output growth and ination. We provide evidence that uctuations in certain scal variables contain valuable information to predict uctuations in output and prices. The distinction between federal and state-local scal indicators yields useful insights and helps dene a new set of stylized facts for US macroeconomic conditions. First, we nd that variations in state-local indirect taxes as well as state government surplus or decit help predict output growth. Next, the federal counterparts of these indicators contain valuable information for ination. Finally, state-local expenditures help predict US ination. A set of formal and informal stability tests conrm that these relationships are stable. The scal indicators in questions are also among the ones that yield the best in-sample and out-of-sample performances.
Introduction
Economists often rely on non-structural autoregressive econometric models such as unrestricted VARs, to explain or to forecast in a parsimonious way variations in key macroeconomic variables such as ination and output. While US output variations can be explained somewhat reliably with the use of a set of relevant variables such as Federal Funds rate and certain monetary aggregates next to past variations in real output itself, empirical work confronts signicant diculties in assigning informative variables to explain US ination movements. Even the Federal Funds rate fails to provide statistically signicant information content to explain ination variations in a stable way (see for example Friedman and Kuttner (1992) ; Stock and Watson (2003) ).
Macroeconomic theory is paying increasing attention to the interaction between scal and monetary policymaking in stabilizing ination, employment and real output.
Such an interaction and its consequences for macro-fundamentals are usually studied within theoretical general equilibrium modelling. However current theoretical models typically focus on aggregate spending and taxes. We believe that some government expenditure/revenues subcomponents may be better related with macroeconomic variables due to certain institutional features or preferences of policymakers. In the literature, there is already evidence that dierent institutional arrangements across US states yield dierent macroeconomic outcomes at least as far as business cycle uctuations are concerned. For instance, Fatás and Mihov (2006) provide a thorough empirical analysis of the macroeconomic eects of the constraints on scal policy and nd that states that face tighter restrictions show less volatile business cycles.
In this paper, we provide new stylized facts for the US economy that may motivate economic theory to explore new transmission channels of scal policymaking on macroeconomic outcomes. We take a non-structural, direct, statistical approach as suggested by Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Sims (1972 Sims ( , 1980 and perform a systematic analysis on the informational role of a wide range of scal policy indicators to explain US ination and real output movements. Reduced form/information value approach, as a preliminary test of statistical connection between certain variables, is immune to questions of 2 causality, exogeneity or controllability of potential instruments.
The discretionary motive or the automatic stabilizers' role in scal policymaking is an important and complex topic, but is not the subject matter of this paper. For a recent survey of the macroeconometric literature on the identication of discretionary scal policy see for istance Caldara and Kamps (2008) .
By relying on straightforward statistical tests, we nd that certain scal indicators, contain additional statistically signicant information to explain US ination and output growth next to the information contained in the Federal Funds rate and autoregressive components of ination and real output. In particular, we nd that changes in the federal budget, federal indirect taxes, as well as state-local expenditures contain valuable lead information for US ination. Moreover, state-local budget and state-local indirect taxes are helpful in predicting US real output growth. Furthermore, informal and formal statistical tests suggest that the information content present in these variables is stable over time.
To the best of our knowledge, there is neither a theoretical explanation nor other empirical contribution highlighting the dierent information content of state-local scal variables as opposed to the federal counterparts. We suppose that one possible determinant has to do with the dierent institutional frameworks of the federal and state-local budgets, which we also document.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the conduct of US scal policy in postwar years and reviews some existing literature on state-local nances. Section 3 presents the dataset used in the paper. Section 4 reports Granger-style regressions based on ination and real output equations that include a set of alternative scal indicators together with the Federal Funds rate. Section 5 conducts stability tests. pronounced increase in the federal decit was recorded.
As Figure 1 -(c) shows, the sum of state-local budgets behaved in a dierent way. In aggregate terms, state-local nances have been close to balanced budget. Indeed, when it comes to US state budgets, the leitmotif is balanced budget rules. Although across the US there are disparities in the set of scal rules that governs a state's ability to raise and spend revenue, all states but Vermont have a more or less stringent scal discipline that foresees balanced budgets. The requirements of the other 49 states can be divided into four groups (Poterba, 1996) :
1. In 44 states, the governor must submit a balanced budget, but the state does not have to enact a budget that matches expenditures and revenues.
2. In 37 states, the legislature must enact a balanced budget, yet actual revenues and expenditures may diverge if there are unexpected scal shocks after the budget is adopted.
4 3. In 6 states, when an unexpected decit develops during the scal year, the governor has to correct the decit in the next budget cycle. Because budget cycles in some states are biennial, this requirement permits substantial periods of budget decits.
4. In 24 out of the 37 states with balanced budget requirements, the constitution prohibits the government from carrying decits into the next budget cycle. This provision represents the strictest anti-decit rule, as it requires the legislature either:
i. to cut spending; or ii. to raise taxes in the scal year when the decit emerges; or iii. to oat short-term debt to be retired in the next scal year.
In 1987, the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) constructed an index that characterizes scal discipline among state governments and ranges from 0 (lax) to 10 (stringent). Only eight states received ACIR scores of 5 or below, whereas 26 received a score of 10 (see Figure 2 ).
<Insert Figure 2 here>
Some researchers investigated implications of these institutional arrangements, for key macroeconomic variables, particularly for real output, and for macroeconomic policy. , for instance, use panel estimation to show that state scal policy has a stabilizing inuence on output, but this inuence dier across business cycles expansions and downturns. When state income rises, government revenue initially increases and then reverts to its initial level, while expenditure remains roughly constant.
However, when state income falls, both revenue and expenditure decline with revenue remaining low for a sustained period. Such asymmetries appear to be associated with balanced budget rules or political conservatism (that may in turn lead to constitutional balanced budget rules). More precisely, the tighter the budget rules, the less eective is scal policy at stimulating the economy than it is at slowing it. On the contrary, in states with relatively less strict budget rules, such as Massachusetts and New York, scal policy appears to mitigate economic slowdowns more than it mutes booms.
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Traditionally scal policy has received less attention than monetary policy in the macroeconomic literature and, with few exceptions, state scal policy has almost been neglected. Among others, Poterba and Rueben (1999) evaluate the eects of state-level revenue and expenditure limits on borrowing costs; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (1990) estimate the impact of ination on the real expenditures of US state-local government;
and <Insert Table 2 here>
In Table 3 , we report the results of unit root tests performed on all the series constructed as explained above. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for real output growth and the growth rates of all the scal variables. The level of the interest rate satises stationarity properties according to the PP test at a 5 percent signicant level and also according to the ADF test at a 10 percent signicance level. The rate of ination is stationary only according to the PP test. In the remainder of the paper we rely on the stationarity of all the aforementioned series.
<Insert Table 3 here>   4 Granger non-causality tests
In this section, we investigate the information content of uctuations of scal indicators for output growth and ination by means of Granger non-causality tests. By denition of Granger causality itself (Granger, 1969; Sims, 1972) , we are not looking for a proper causality relationship. Instead, we aim at detecting whether, in the uctuations of some scal indicators, there is exploitable information that helps predict uctuations in output 1 Given a quarterly variable X t , ∆x t = 400 × (ln X t − ln X t−1 ).
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and prices, beyond those already predictable on the basis of uctuations in output and prices themselves and other promptly observable variables, such as the interest rate.
Our specications for real output changes and ination follow closely Friedman and Kuttner (1992) . However, while they try a number of alternative nancial variables and monetary aggregates as a proxy of the monetary policy instrument, we simply use the short-term interest rate. This choice depends on the fact that we are interested in the information content of scal indicators and not in the comparative performance of alternative nancial variables.
The specication for real output changes ∆y t is given by the following equation:
The terms ∆y t , ∆p t , i t , ∆g t , ν t represent output growth, ination, the short term interest rate, the change in an alternative scal indicator and an error term respectively.
The ination equation takes the following specication:
where all variables are dened as in equation (1). <Insert Table 5 here> 2 We also run the tests described below using rst dierences of the Federal funds rate but dierences in the results are negligible.
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We test for Granger non-causality of the scal indicators by imposing the null hypothesis that all the lags of each alternative indicator are jointly insignicant, i.e. H O : Table 5 , we show that uctuations in government indirect taxes (taxes on production and import) and in the government surplus/decit have information content on both output growth and ination. At a more disaggregated level, uctuations in state-local indirect taxes and decit contain useful information for output growth (at a 1 percent signicance level); for ination it is the federal analogues to be informative (at 1 percent and 5 percent signicance levels, respectively). Moreover, contributions for government social insurance at the national and federal level and the non-defense component of federal expenditures help predict output growth. Finally, state-local total expenditures, and gross investment help predict ination at a 10 percent signicance level.
Some previous studies have explored state-local nances and we surveyed them in section 2. However, to our knowledge, there are no other contributions that nd an information-content role for state-local expenditures on US ination and state-local revenues or decits on output growth.
We also report Granger causality tests run on the Federal funds rate. In all specications, this is signicant at a 1 percent level in the output growth equation and insignicant in the ination equation.
3 However, adding more lags of the interest rate (results not reported) helps retrieve signicance also in the ination equation. Thus, in the cases in which we nd an information-content role for the scal variable, the latter does not substitute but adds further information to that already contained in past values of the interest rate.
<Insert Table 6 here>
In Table 6 , as a measure of comparative goodness of t, we report the Akaike information criteria (AIC) of all the estimated specications of equations (1) and (2) in ascending order. All the specications in which we nd information content in the scal variable are among the ones with the lowest AIC (top ten items in Table 5 ). According to AIC, the specications including indirect taxes are the ones with the best t. <Insert Figure 4 here> Figure 4 shows that, apart from some subsamples for government decit and statelocal investment expenditures, the remaining recursive p-values of the scal components for which we nd an information-content role for ination are stable.
Formal stability tests
To formally evaluate the stability of coecients in the Granger-style specications, we run stability tests for one or more unknown structural breakpoints in the autoregressive coecients of the scal variables.
We compute three dierent statistics: the Quandt likelihood ratio statistic in Wald form (sup-Wald) as in Andrews (1993) <Insert Table 7 here> 5 To obtain the recursive residuals we scale each one-step ahead forecast error by a term proportional to the forecast variance. Namely, let x t b t−1 be the forecast, where x t is the row vector of observations on the regressors in period t and b t−1 is the estimated vector of coecients obtained by using data up to period t − 1. The forecast error is y t − x t b t−1 , where y t is the actual observation of the dependent variable, while the forecast variance is σ 2 1 + x t (X t X t ) −1 x t . We compute the recursive residual r t as
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A set of formal and informal stability tests conrm that these relationships are stable.
The scal indicators in questions are also among the ones that yield the best in-sample and out-of-sample performances.
In sum, we provide new stylized facts for US macroeconomic conditions related to scal indicators. We believe that these new stylized facts can help identify possible scal and monetary policy transmission channels that can be explored in future empirical and theoretical research. 
